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June 1996 ment playing at most a marginal role.2 Studies of strategic bargaining processes in parliamentary systems therefore typically ignore legislatures, focusing instead on government formation and cabinet stability.3 And comparative research on legislatures typically ignores strategic bargaining processes, focusing instead on measuring the relative weakness of parliaments in policymaking, identifying the roles of individual representatives, and delineating the "system functions" that parliaments play across polities.4
The propensity to assume away the relevance of bargaining processes that occur between the births and deaths of governments is unwise. Although cabinets clearly hold substantial policymaking powers, the most serious conflict in parliamentary systems generally does not lie primarily between one institutional arena, the government, and another, the parliament. Instead, the most serious conflict generally lies between parties and party factions that are represented both in the government and the parliament. In Great Britain, for instance, there were Euro-rebels in Major's cabinet and among backbenchers in Parliament. Conflict between these factions certainly played itself out in the party caucus, in private debates among cabinet ministers, and on the floor of Parliament. What was significant about the resolution of the intraparty conflict, however, was that Major held control of an important institutional weapon, the confidence vote procedure. Of course, in the many parliamentary systems that routinely produce coalition or minority governments, conflict across governing parties will be on-going, making the role of institutional arrangements in shaping bargaining even more important than in Britain's majoritarian system. It is therefore essential to explore the effect of institutional arrangements on how political parties and party factions reach and maintain policy agreements after government formation is complete. This paper takes a step toward filling this lacunae in our understanding of parliamentary institutions by focusing specifically on the confidence vote procedure. I first describe the precise structure of confidence vote procedures in eighteen advanced industrial democracies. I then use this description to develop a formal model which analyzes strategic interactions in a multidimensional policy space between a cabinet minister, a prime minister, and the prime minister's majority in parliament. I explore these interactions under several alternative assumptions about the policy, office, and electoral motivations of the agents.
The analysis makes two contributions to the study of parliamentary democracy. First, the model indicates that confidence vote procedures should make it possible for The second contribution of the analysis concerns the actual use of confidence vote procedures. In principle, the procedure could be used on every bill a parliament considers. In practice, it is used with great discretion. Why, then, are confidence vote procedures invoked on particular bills? Some might expect that a prime minister's decision to use a confidence vote procedure will be influenced by the cost of losing his or her job, by the costs to the MPs of throwing the government out of office, by the dimensionality of the policy space, or by the level of policy conflict between MPs and the prime minister. But the analysis indicates that none of these factors directly affects procedural choice. Instead, the model focuses attention on the exogenous costs that prime ministers pay when they use confidence vote procedures, and, more important, on the electoral incentives of MPs. In the model, if the various parties or party factions supporting the government benefit electorally from clearly distinguishing their policy positions from one another, then they can adopt position-taking strategies on the floor of parliament (with each party or faction publicly supporting the policies most preferred by its constituents). In adopting such strategies, the parties or factions communicate valuable information about policy positions to voters, and they compel the prime minister to invoke a confidence vote procedure. Consequently, although the procedure clearly provides the prime minister an important tool for favorably resolving disputes among members of the government, the actual use of confidence vote procedures should not be viewed as a strong-arm tactic that a prime minister employs against parliament. Rather, the procedures arise in response to exogenous electoral considerations that encourage position-taking strategies on the floor of parliament.
THE STRUCTURE OF CONFIDENCE VOTE PROCEDURES
The confidence vote procedure is part of a broad class of institutional arrangements that formalize a prime minister's dependence on majority support in the legislature. As noted above, these institutional arrangements are usefully divided into two categories. The first includes procedures that enable members of legislatures to initiate votes on government survival. These procedures, typically called motions of censure or motions of no confidence, exist in a variety of forms, but all share a distinguishing feature: They permit a majority in parliament to vote up or down on the continuation in power of the prime minister and the cabinet. Although I do not formally model votes of no confidence, the existence of such procedures plays an important role in developing the assumptions in the model of confidence vote procedures analyzed below. The second category of institutional arrangements includes procedures initiated by the government. The confidence vote procedure is obviously in this category, as are several other types of confidence votes. In some countries, for example, the prime minister must receive a formal vote of confidence at the time of government investiture.5 Many countries also permit prime ministers to request a general vote of confidence in the government, without attaching a specific policy declaration to the vote. Some countries permit votes of confidence in specific cabinet ministers, which typically occurs when there are questions of unethical behavior. What distinguishes the confidence vote procedure from these other types of confidence votes, however, is that the confi-5 Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland all require formal investiture votes (Laver and Schofield 1990, 64). dence vote procedure is used after government formation is complete and in the context of legislative debates on specific policy issues or specific aspects of the government's program. Table 1 provides data on the institutional structure of confidence vote procedures in eighteen democratic systems. The first column indicates that confidence vote procedures generally exist in parliamentary democracies and that there are three sources of authority for such procedures: constitutions, standing orders, and convention. In Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain, the constitution authorizes the government to make policies questions of confidences6 In Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Portugal and Spain, provisions in the standing orders of parliament establish or clarify confidence vote procedures.7 By convention, the government can make the vote on a specific policy a question of confidence in Australia, Canada, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom.8 Only in Iceland is there neither a written rule nor a convention that permits the government to make a specific policy issue a question of confidence.
Where confidence vote procedures exist, they share three important structural features. First, as column two in Table 1 indicates, prime ministers can generally, at least in principle, act unilaterally. In Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway,9 Portugal, and the United Kingdom, there are no formal institutional constraints on the prime minister (although consultation with the cabinet is generally presumed). In Australia, France, and the Netherlands, the prime minister must formally consult the cabinet but is not bound by these consultations. In Finland, Italy, Spain, and Sweden, the prime minister must receive the formal support of the cabinet before a confidence vote procedure can be invoked. Of course, even if a prime minister is not formally constrained by institutional arrangements, s/he will often be constrained by political factors and may pay large personal costs if s/he attempts to proceed unilaterally to invoke a confidence vote procedure. These political constraints will play an important role in the model analyzed below.
The second important feature of confidence vote procedures is that a prime minister can use them to propose any policy s/he wishes. An example from Italy illustrates. In March 1995, nonpartisan Prime Minister Lamberto Dini submitted a "mini-budget" to the lower house specifying various austerity measures (including increases in the gasoline tax and the VAT). Members of the lower house proposed more than 150 amendments, many of which undermined Dini's goal to contain the Italian budget deficit to 8% of GDP. After several "expensive" amendments were adopted, Dini invoked a confidence vote procedure on his budget package. His motion excluded the adopted amendments as well as many that had not yet been voted. The confidence vote passed, allowing Dini to obtain the austerity measures he desired.
An example fr6m Fourth Republic France further illustrates the lack of constraints on a prime minister's proposal under a confidence vote procedure. During the budget debate in December 1957, numerous amendments opposed by the government were adopted. In response, Prime Minister Felix Gaillard posed the fol7In Italy, the standing orders permit confidence votes not only on specific issues but also on specific articles or amendments. This procedure formally entered the Italian standing orders in 1971. Prior to that time, it existed by convention. In Belgium, a confidence vote procedure was not established in the standing orders until 1995. As these examples illustrate, a prime minister not only can use confidence vote procedures to propose any policy s/he wishes but also can do so at any time in the legislative process, including at the very end. In fact, confidence vote procedures can be used by a prime minister to reverse parliamentary defeats. The Maastricht example from Great Britain illustrates how this can occur.1"
The final important institutional feature of confidence vote procedures is the voting rule. In most countries, a prime minister's motion carries if it receives a majority of the votes cast, but there are three exceptions. In Belgium, Germany, and France, abstentions always count for the government because a prime minister's motion carries unless a majority of the members elected to the lower house vote against the motion. In Spain, abstentions always count against the prime minister because a motion of confidence is adopted only if it receives the votes of a majority of the members elected to the lower house.
A MODEL OF THE CONFIDENCE VOTE PROCEDURE
The discussion in the previous section can be used to guide the development of a formal model of confidence vote procedures. The legislative process in parliamentary systems typically begins when a cabinet minister (such as the minister of finance or agriculture) submits a bill to the parliament (although MPs can initiate legislation even if there is no proposal by a cabinet minister). Legislative consideration of a bill then begins in a committee, where amendments are made before a report to the floor. On the floor, the bill is debated, additional amendments are submitted and voted, and "1 The confidence vote procedure in Fourth Republic France was flawed in an important way: It was possible for the government to invoke a confidence vote on a particular policy, for the policy to be defeated, but for the government to survive. This could occur because a simple plurality could defeat a bill, but an absolute majority of members was necessary to defeat the government. There were several efforts to amend this provision during the Fourth Republic, and the procedure was a major issue in the drafting of the Fifth (which corrected the problem). ultimately there is a vote on the entire bill. As discussed, in countries where a confidence vote procedure exists, the prime minister can generally demand a vote of confidence on a specific policy at any time during this process, including after parliament adopts or defeats a bill.
To analyze how confidence vote procedures shape legislative bargaining, the model presented here focuses on the interactions between a cabinet minister (C), the prime minister (P), and the prime minister's majority (M) in parliament, where M is a finite set of n members, the generic element of which is i. M is assumed to have ex ante identifiable members because, in practice, exogenous constraints associated with government formation almost always prevent a prime minister from crafting ad hoc majorities on a bill-by-bill basis. Instead, the prime minister must be able to find a bill that is supported by a set of parties who are defined when a government forms in support of the prime minister. Thus, in the model each member of M must agree before any legislation is adopted, and each member can ensure that the prime minister falls in a vote of confidence. One may think of these members of M as the parliamentary parties (or factions) in a governing coalition, as the parties in government and the opposition support party (or parties) during minority government, or as some subset of pivotal parties during surplus majority governments. In the case of a strongly unified, single-party majority government, one may wish to think of M as having a single member.
I would underline that the assumption of ex ante identifiable members of M is made only to capture the important constraints that government formation processes typically impose on parliamentary behavior. For those uncomfortable with the assumption, it will become clear below that the analysis would not be fundamentally altered if one were to ignore the constraints imposed by government formation and were to assume instead that, on any policy, any majority of members could accept or defeat a bill.
The model has four stages, which are summarized in Figure 1 . First, during the proposal stage, the cabinet minister submits a bill to parliament. C can propose any policy he wishes in a multidimensional policy space. Let C's strategy, then, be a mapping bc xo->B, where xO is the status quo policy, and B is a nonempty, convex, and compact subset of 93m.
Second, in the parliamentary stage, the bill undergoes the normal legislative process. Formal amendment and voting rules vary across countries, making it impossible to capture all the subtleties of these procedures in a single model. Typically, however, amendment rules in parliamentary systems are quite open, permitting MPs to submit and vote on almost any amendment they wish. The model thus makes two substantive assumptions about the parliamentary stage. First, it assumes that each member of M must go on record for a specific policy. Put differently, each member must vote for a specific policy outcome.12 Second, the model assumes that, through the amendment process, all members of M can go on record for any policy they wish. In practice, an MP could go on record for his or her most preferred policy by proposing it in an amendment, voting for the amendment, and voting against any policy that differs from the one proposed in the amendment. Similarly, an MP could use the amendment process to go on record for any other policy or could go on record for the status quo by voting against any proposal to change existing policy. I assume that if P is indifferent between accepting bM and proposing some other policy by using a confidence vote procedure, then P will accept bM.
Rather than formally modeling amendment processes
If P accepts the bill adopted by the majority in the parliamentary stage, the game ends, and the policy outcome is the majority's bill. If P proposes a new policy using a confidence vote, then in the voting stage, each member of M must decide whether to accept the policy or vote the prime minister out of office. Formally, let ai be the strategy for i to accept bp, and let NCi be the strategy for i to vote (no confidence) against the government. The voting strategy for all i is a mapping si: B-> {ai} U {NCi}. Thus, I assume there are no abstentions. The prime minister will fall, retaining the status quo, if any member votes against the prime minister (i.e., if si = NCi for any i E M). I assume that if P invokes a confidence vote procedure, member i will accept P's proposal if i is indifferent between accepting and voting no.
The equilibrium concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Formally, let b,*(xo) be the equilibrium proposal by C; let b*(b,) be the equilibrium proposal strategy for each i E M; let b*(bM) be P's equilibrium procedural strategy (where bM is defined by bi as noted above); and let si(bp) be the equilibrium voting strategy for each i E M.
The standard assumption in spatial models is that legislators are motivated exclusively by the desire to achieve the best possible policy outcome from the legislative process. In the confidence vote model presented here, the standard assumption is a special case. The utility functions of the agents, therefore, include several parameters. First, I assume that the policy preferences of each agent (k = C, P, and i) over the issue space B are represented by strictly quasi-concave utility functions, Uk(O). Let Xk = arg maxX-B Uk(x) be k's ideal point, and assume Uk(Xk) = 0. For simplicity and without loss of generality, I assume that xi / x; for all i, j E M.
Agents in parliamentary systems may be concerned about final policies for electoral reasons: Voters often use policy outcomes to reward and sanction political parties. But it may also be that in bargaining for the best possible policy outcomes, parties will actually decrease their electoral support because of the signals they send to voters about policy positions. In parliamentary systems, particularly those with a high incidence of coalition or minority governments, parliamentary agents face the unique challenge of being forced to cooperate in the legislature with their electoral competitors. If Christian Democrats and Liberals, for example, form a coalition government, these parties must reach policy agreements and vote together on a wide range of issues, and they must then campaign against each other for votes in the next election. This obviously creates problems for voters and parties alike. Voters face the problem of assessing which parties are responsible for which policy outcomes and of determining the policy positions of political parties on various issues. Parties face the problem of communicating information about issue positions and political responsibility to the voters. Of course, on some legislation, consensus exists, political debate is innocuous or nonexistent, and communication therefore is unimportant. But on many other issues, voters are attentive and will use party positions on particular issues to determine their choices in subsequent elections. Consequently, the legislative process is important not only as a channel by which policies are chosen but also as a forum for communicating information to voters about issue positions.
I do not explicitly model the behavior of voters. Instead, I assume that the ideal points and utility functions of the agents in the model are induced by the agents' constituencies. Thus, there may be electoral costs associated with making policy proposals that diverge from these ideal points, particularly on those issue dimensions most valued by constituents. Formally, x -0 is a parameter that taps voter sensitivity on a particular bill. The electoral penalty from proposals for C is given by 4x[u,(b,)], and the electoral penalty from proposals for all i E M is given by o4[ui(bi)]. Thus, for any (x > 0, the electoral penalty associated with any proposal increases as the proposal diverges from an agent's ideal point.
Since the prime minister is chosen by the majority rather than by the voters, and since she makes policy proposals using the extraordinary device of confidence votes (rather than the normal legislative process), the prime minister's electoral implications from making proposals are somewhat different than those faced by C or M. The prime minister, for example, may be sanctioned by voters for using a confidence vote procedure to make policy proposals that are distant from the prime minister's ideal point (i.e., pay c[up(bp)]). But the electoral implications may also be important even if (x is zero or if P makes a proposal very near her ideal point. The use of confidence vote procedures is a very serious political event that generally receives front-page attention-often of the negative variety. The prime minister often wishes to avoid this kind of attention, fearing that the use of confidence votes will signal to the voters that the government does not have a majority for its policy or is not respecting the wishes of the voters' directly elected representatives. In addition, using the confidence vote procedure may alienate other members of the government. Since adopting strategies that create divisions within a governing party or coalition may be electorally costly (Jennings 1961, 496; King 1976 King , 1981 , the prime minister will often wish to avoid these procedures when their use exacerbates internal conflict. Thus, the prime minister may be willing to make concessions simply to avoid the use of confidence vote procedures.
Although rare, there may be exogenous electoral benefits from using the confidence vote procedure. This may occur when the use of a confidence vote suppresses debate on specific provisions in a bill, thereby limiting the appearance of internal party divisions. Duverger (1987, chapter 4) and Baumgartner (1989, 178-83) argue that this use of confidence votes has occurred in France.
Since many factors (in addition to the precise nature of the prime minister's proposal) may influence the electoral implications of invoking a confidence vote procedure, I do not focus exclusively on a[up(bp)]. Instead, I assume that the prime minister may pay some exogenous electoral "cost," e E 91, for invoking a confidence vote procedure, where e includes all exogenous costs or benefits from invoking a confidence vote. Since e may be zero or negative, I assume that there may be no electoral implications from using the procedure or that there may actually be benefits from using the procedure to obtain a particular policy.
Next consider the preferences of the agents over induced outcomes from the defeat of the government in the voting stage. When the government falls, the cabinet ministers and the prime minister generally lose not only their job but also important opportunities to influence policy and the distribution of government resources in the future. It is therefore reasonable to assume that C and P may pay a positive cost if the government falls, and thus they may be willing to make policy concessions in order to keep their job.
Similarly, if the government falls on a vote of confidence, there may be costs to the members of M-and there should never be benefits. The justification for assuming that there are no benefits is straightforward. As previously discussed, a parliamentary majority can remove a prime minister from office at any time by submitting and voting a motion of censure. Thus, the existence of any government in power suggests that, other things equal, a majority places a nonnegative value on keeping that government in place. The costs of bringing down the government are equally straightforward. Throwing the prime minister out of office may lead to a government that implements undesirable policies in the future, may entail loss of access to governmental sources of patronage, and may lead to loss of one's seat if an election ensues. The members of M may therefore be willing to make short-term policy sacrifices to ensure that the prime minister is around in the future.14 Formally, let ck -0 be the censure costs to agents k = C, P, and i if the government falls in the voting stage.
I can now summarize the utility functions, U, for each agent in the game. Let y be a final policy outcome from the confidence vote model. Then, the utility function for C is given by: Since any proposal by P in the procedural stage must be accepted by all members of M, the set of policies that P can propose using a confidence vote procedure and that will not lead to the fall of the government isA = nN1 Ai. Note that for all i E M, Ai is a closed and convex set containing x0. The set A is therefore nonempty, closed, and convex. The prime minister will be defeated if she proposes any policy that is not in A. Thus, the best obtainable policy that the prime minister can achieve by invoking a confidence vote procedure is x = arg maxXCA up(x). Since A is nonempty, closed, and convex, by strict quasi-concavity of up, x always exists and is unique. Note that if the model assumed that P could create ad hoc majorities, then the same logic would permit P to identify x (which may or may not be unique), although she would have to compute the set A for all possible majorities.
The utility the prime minister receives from proposing x during the procedural stage depends on the exogenous electoral implications, e, associated with actually invoking a confidence vote procedure on a policy issue. One can use x and e to define the set of policies that the prime minister prefers to accept in the procedural stage rather than invoke a CVP to propose xi: E = {x E B:up(x) -up(X) -e}.
It is useful to note that if there are large electoral benefits associated with invoking a confidence vote procedure (e < 0), then E may be empty.
The strategy for P in the procedural stage follows from the definitions of x and E. The logic behind proposition 2 is simple. The policy preferences and censure costs of the members of M, together with the status quo, determine the set of policies that all members would prefer to accept rather than bring down the government. The prime minister 276 can always, without fear of being voted out of office, obtain the policy (x) she most prefers from this set of obtainable policies by invoking a confidence vote procedure. But since using a confidence vote may trigger an exogenous electoral cost or benefit, there may also exist a set of policies that P would prefer to accept rather than use a confidence vote to propose the best obtainable policy. Thus, if P's policy utility from accepting M's proposal is greater than the total utility-policy and electoral-that P receives from using a confidence vote, the prime minister will accept M's proposal. Otherwise, with one exception, P will invoke a confidence vote procedure to propose the best policy from this set of obtainable policies. The one exception occurs when the best obtainable policy for the prime minister is the status quo (so that x = x0), and P pays no cost of being thrown out of office (so that cp = 0). In this case, if M adopts a policy that is not at least as good for P as the status quo, then P can propose any policy that she weakly prefers to the status quo. If P proposes a policy that she strictly prefers to the status quo, she will provoke censure. Remarks 1 and 2 in the appendix indicate that it should be quite unlikely for this to occur. Figure 2 depicts the logic of these interactions. Assume there are only two members of M, with ideal points at x1 and x2. The set of policies that a member of M would prefer to accept (if proposed by the prime minister under a confidence vote) rather than censure the government is a function of the location of the status quo and the censure costs of the member. This set (Ai) is depicted by the area inside the (bold) indifference curves surrounding the (thin) indifference curves of each member through x0. The intersection of these two (bold) indifference curves is the set of policies that both members of M would prefer to accept rather than censure the prime minister (the set A).
The best policy from this set for P is x. The set of policies that P would prefer to accept rather than use a confidence vote procedure (the set E) is a function of 
PARLIAMENTARY STRATEGIES AND THE USE OF THE CONFIDENCE VOTE PROCEDURE
The members of M can make two different types of proposals: those that provoke a confidence vote ("provoking proposals") and those that do not ("acceptable proposals"). To understand when one should observe actual confidence vote procedures, it is necessary to describe the circumstances under which members of M will make each type of proposal during the parliamentary stage.
The utility for each member i from making an acceptable proposal, bi, is ui(bi) -4[ui(bi)]. The utility for each member from making a provoking proposal depends on whether x = x0 and cp > 0. The greatest utility that a member could ever receive from making a provoking proposal, however, is ui(fc), which occurs when bi = xi, proposing xi provokes a confidence vote procedure, and the prime minister's confidence vote proposal does not lead to her fall. Let Di be the set of policies which, if proposed by M and accepted by P, give member i a (weakly) greater utility than i could ever receive from making a proposal that provokes a confidence vote. But the prime minister's electoral costs are also very important. As these increase, the likelihood that the set E intersects the set D also increases. As noted, for the positive e depicted in Figure 2 , the two sets intersect, and the members can make an acceptable proposal that moves the status quo. But if the electoral costs decrease, then given the position-taking incentives depicted in Figure 2 , at some point no policy will be acceptable to P and also in M's feasible set. In general, as P's electoral costs increase, as long as there are feasible policies for the members of M (i.e., D is nonempty) the likelihood that M can make an acceptable proposal also increases. Thus, the use of confidence votes should increase as a prime minister's electoral costs of using the procedure decrease.
So far I have considered only the factors that should lead to the use (or avoidance) of confidence vote procedures. It is also important to highlight factors that the model predicts should be irrelevant to predicting the use of confidence votes. Two factors unexpectedly have no effect on the incidence of confidence vote procedures. The first is the prime minister's censure costs. Some might expect the use of confidence votes to decline as the prime minister's censure costs increase, but the model indicates that those costs will never influence the decision to use a confidence vote procedure because of the sequence of decision making. Since the prime minister can always identify a unique poJicy that represents the best obtainable outcome from a confidence vote procedure, she never need consider censure costs in formulating legislative strategy.
The second irrelevant variable is the dimensionality of the policy space. Scholars who have studied restrictive amendment rules in Congress may suspect that confidence vote procedures should often be used to stabilize legislative choices that are made on more than one policy dimension, much as closed rules are said to stabilize log-rolls in Congress.15 On the one hand, this intuition is useful because the prime minister's possibility of using a confidence vote defines in multiple dimension policy spaces a reversion policy around which policy bargaining must be structured. On the other hand, it turns out that the strategic considerations of the prime minister are the same for any dimensionality of the policy space. That is, regardless of whether policy choices can be made on one dimension or many, there exists a unique best obtainable policy which is central to the prime minister's procedural decision.
Several other variables have no direct influence on the use of confidence vote procedures, but may have an indirect effect through an interaction with the positiontaking incentives of the members of the majority. These variables include the heterogeneity of the majority, the censure costs of the members of the majority, and the level of policy conflict between members of the majority and the prime minister.16 Consider the heterogeneity of the majority. If a third member of the majority is added at X3 in Figure 2 , and if there are no electoral implications associated with making proposals, the members of M can adopt x, and no confidence vote procedure will be used. But if there are any position-taking incentives for the members of M, then there will exist no policy that the members could propose, that would be accepted by P, and that would give all members a higher utility than they receive from proposing their ideal points (i.e., D = 0). Thus, for this majority of three members, if positiontaking incentives exist, one should expect to observe position strategies in parliament and the use of the confidence vote procedure by the prime minister. It is important to bear in mind, however, that if the ideal point of the third member of the majority were very close to the ideal point of either of the first two members, then it would be more likely that even with positive position-taking incentives, the members of the majority could make a proposal that would be acceptable to the prime minister. It is not, then, the size of the Similarly, the magnitude of the majority members' censure costs and the level of policy disagreement between members of M and the prime minister influence procedural choice only if (1) these variables take values that move the best obtainable policy away from the members' ideal points, and (2) there are position-taking incentives for the parties supporting the government. If there are no such incentives, then regardless of the level of policy conflict or the magnitude of censure costs, the members can propose the prime minister's best obtainable policy and avoid a confidence vote procedure. If position-taking incentives are positive, then to propose a policy that is near the best obtainable policy will result in a larger electoral penalty than would be the case if the best obtainable policy were not so distant from the members' ideal points. Thus, censure costs and policy conflict can only indirectly influence the incidence of confidence vote procedures. If position-taking incentives are positive, and if increases in censure costs or policy conflict move the prime minister's best obtainable policy away from the member's ideal points, then these variables may trigger position-taking strategies. The role of these variables in the analysis, therefore, highlights the fundamental link that exists between position-taking incentives in parliament and the incidence of confidence vote procedures.
THE ROLE OF CABINET MINISTERS
An important implication of the model is that opportunities for members of the majority to make acceptable proposals are never influenced by C's initial proposal. Instead, for any bc, the members must undertake the normal legislative process, whether it be to adopt the same proposal made by C, offer a different proposal, or preserve the status quo. Since a confidence vote proposal by the prime minister can follow any proposal emerging from this legislative process, P's preferences and procedural prerogatives-not C's initial proposalshape legislative strategies in the parliamentary stage. Thus, in this model, C's proposal never directly affects the outcome of the game. The optimal proposal strategy for the cabinet minister thus depends solely only on whether there are electoral implications associated with proposals. Proposition 4 summarizes this logic and is stated without proof. Coordination is important for two reasons. First, all the members will desire to avoid inefficient equilibria that exist even when the necessary and sufficient conditions for acceptable proposals to change the status quo are met. For example, assume there are three members of the majority and that D n E / 0. It is always an equilibrium for each member to propose his ideal point. In this case, the majority's proposal is the status quo, and since there are at least three distinct proposals by the members, no member can propose any policy that will change the nature of the majority's proposal.
But each member of the majority and the prime minister prefer the outcome from an equilibrium with acceptable proposals to the outcome from this alternative equilibrium that provokes a confidence vote procedure. More generally, any equilibrium that provokes a confidence vote when the necessary and sufficient conditions are satisfied (D nE 0) is inefficient. Members of the majority will therefore prefer to coordinate on the efficient equilibria that avoid confidence vote procedures. C's proposal could facilitate this coordination.
Second, even if the members coordinate on an acceptable policy, the model is silent on how the members of M reach agreement on a particular policy proposal. That is, the model lends no insight into how the members may reach agreement on proposing a particular x E D n E.'7 Again, C's proposal can signal which acceptable policy the members of M should propose.
The model, therefore, identifies different opportunities that the prime minister, cabinet ministers, and members of parliaments have to shape policy outcomes. The prime minister's prerogative to invoke a confidence vote procedure permits the prime minister to define the set of acceptable policies from which any final policy outcome must be chosen (the set E). The preferences of the members of the majority determine whether there exist acceptable policies (policies in E) that are also feasible (policies in D). The cabinet minister's "first move advantage" lies in the opportunity to signal to the members of the majority which feasible policy, if one exists, they should propose. Although the cabinet minister is often constrained by the preferences of the prime minister, the opportunity to facilitate coordination on particular policies in the parliamentary stage will often have important benefits for the cabinet minister and his party.
It is important to note that the results from the model presented here lead to quite different conclusions about the role of cabinet ministers than we find in previous models that analyze the distribution of cabinet portfolios. The standard assumption in previous models is that 17 One possibility for addressing this shortcoming would be to model explicitly the legislative structures that constrain decision making in the parliamentary stage. Of course, these structures will differ across countries, and including such structures would not alter the insights from this paper into how confidence votes constrain parliamentary decision making (because for any structure, the government can always make the last move). cabinet ministers can dictate policy outcomes on issues within their portfolios (see, e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks 1990, Laver and Shepsle 1990, 1995) . The model here suggests that when we integrate prime ministers and confidence vote procedures into the analysis, this assumption in previous research is too strong. Instead, in systems in which the prime minister can unilaterally invoke confidence vote procedures, one should assume that cabinet ministers can only choose policy outcomes from within a set of feasible policies defined by the preferences of the prime minister. In systems in which the prime minister cannot unilaterally invoke confidence vote procedures, one must model the precise decisionmaking structure that leads to the collective decision to invoke confidence vote procedures in order to understand the institutional constraints on individual ministers. Consequently, integrating the prime minister into models of portfolio distribution and analyzing the mechanisms of cabinet decision making should lead to a deeper understanding of portfolio distribution in multiparty government.
DISCUSSION
By allowing the prime minister to make the final policy proposal, confidence vote procedures give the prime minister substantial influence over final policy outcomes, even when these procedures are not invoked. If members of the majority bear no censure cost, confidence vote procedures enable the prime minister to choose any final policy outcome from the set of policies that the majority prefers to the status quo. And if members of the majority pay an exogenous cost of censuring the government (which is likely the case if parties exercise strong discipline or if the prime minister controls dissolution), then the confidence vote procedure is even more valuable to the prime minister because she can use it to extract-in policy currency-the majority's censure costs. Consequently, confidence vote procedures ensure that the ability of political parties in parliaments to shape policy outcomes after government formation is complete will be sharply constrained by the policy preferences of the prime minister.
Several observations about this claim are warranted. First, parties and factions in the legislature will find it difficult to use the institutional arrangements of parliamentary government to negate the effect of confidence vote procedures on policy outcomes. Suppose, for example, that the prime minister bears a cost if she falls in a censure vote. One might expect that in some circumstances the majority could turn the tables, forcing the prime minister to make policy concessions in order to avoid being thrown out of office. After all, members of the legislature can always threaten to vote a motion of censure. Is it not possible for the majority to use the threat of censure to extract policy concessions from the prime minister?
The negative answer to this question lies in the structure of censure motions, which unlike confidence vote procedures are used to veto the government, not to implement a new policy. In other words, when members of parliament submit and vote a motion of censure, the immediate policy implications of the vote on this motion are nil. Either the government survives or falls, but in neither case do specific policy changes follow directly from the voting outcome. Confidence vote procedures, because they permit the prime minister to make a take-it-or-leave-it policy proposal, therefore play a more important role than censure motions in influencing parliamentary bargaining processes. As long as the prime minister uses confidence vote procedures only to propose policies that all members of the majority prefer to the induced outcome from censure, majority members cannot credibly threaten censure to obtain a better policy.
It is interesting to observe that this proposal power that a prime minister enjoys thanks to confidence vote procedures creates a relationship between the executive and the legislature that is the inverse of what is found in most presidential systems. In the United States, for example, the legislature typically makes the final policy proposal, and the executive can only veto, not alter, this proposal.18 In parliamentary systems with confidence vote procedures, although the legislature often appears to be able to propose and vote the final policy, the executive can use confidence vote procedures to make the final policy proposal. If the parliament does not anticipate that the prime minister could use a confidence vote procedure, it will find itself in the same position as the presidential executive, that is, with an ability only to veto someone else's proposal (in this case, by vetoing the executive itself).
A second useful observation about the prime minister's proposal power is related to the previous discussion of cabinet ministers and portfolio distribution. Since the structure of confidence vote procedures grants crucial proposal powers to prime ministers, choosing the prime minister will obviously be among the most important decisions that parties in parliaments ever make. The potential for the prime minister to use confidence vote procedures to move policy outcomes away from those that might be chosen by the parliamentary majority obviously depends not only on the costs to the prime minister of using a confidence vote procedure, but also on the level of divergence between the preferences of the prime minister and the majority. It would seem that high levels of divergence will seldom occur in countries that routinely produce cohesive, single-party majorities (although, as we have seen, even in countries like Great Britain, majorities are at times incohesive). In countries in which coalition or minority governments are the norm, it will be more difficult for members of the legislature to choose a prime minister who will share the policy preferences of all members of the majority across issues and over time. It seems likely, then, that in such countries, parties will be more likely to develop norms that constrain the prime minister's ability to act unilaterally (or, in the language of the model, that make the 18 An obvious exception occurs when a president enjoys a line-item veto. A president also often enjoys various types of decree authority which can entail significant policy proposal power (Carey and Shugart 1995).
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costs of acting unilaterally very high). The model thus underscores the importance of including the policy preferences of prime ministers and the institutional structures of cabinets in theories of government formation.
Third, although confidence vote procedures give prime ministers a significant last-move advantage, the use of a confidence vote procedure should not be interpreted as an act by the prime minister against the parliament. Since agents in parliament must always anticipate that a prime minister could make a policy a question of confidence, these agents must also weigh the policy gains of cooperation with coalition partners against the electoral gains of adopting position-taking strategies. When position-taking incentives are sufficiently strong, parties can go on record in parliament for the precise policies that their constituents most prefer, knowing that in adopting this strategy, they will trigger a confidence vote procedure. In this sense, the use of confidence vote procedures is not decided by the prime minister. Instead, it is decided by the parties in parliament, who knowingly force confidence vote procedures for electoral reasons.
This Proof of Proposition 2. By Proposition 1 and the definition of x, all members of M will accept x if it is proposed by P. The utility P receives from using a confidence vote to propose x is therefore up(x) -e, and the utility P receives from accepting any bM is up(bM).
Consider bM E E. By definition of E, P prefers accepting any policy in E to proposing bp = x. Since x is the best policy P can propose using a confidence vote, P also prefers accepting any bM E E to proposing any bp * x.
Consider E -? 0. If E = 0, then by definition of E, the utility P receives from proposing x (up(x) -e) is positive (which implies e < 0). Since the utility for P from accepting any bM is at most zero (if e = 0 and bM = xp), P receives a higher utility from proposing x than from accepting any bM. P prefers proposing x to proposing any bp 4 A (because bp 4 A results in censure, yielding a utility of up(x0) -ecp). And by definition of x, P prefers proposing x to proposing any policy other policy in A. Thus, the optimal strategy for P is to propose x.
Consider E * 0 and bM 0 E. By definition of E, P receives a higher utility from proposing x than from accepting bM 0 E. Thus, P will never accept bM 0 E. P's optimal strategy depends on the relationship between x and x0, and on P's censure costs.
(a) If x * x(,, then, since x0 E A, P prefers proposing x to proposing x(. By definition of x, P also prefers proposing x to proposing any other policy in A. Finally, since proposing any policy that leads to censure results in an outcome of x0, P prefers proposing x to proposing any policy that is not in A. (b) By definition of x, if x = x(,, then P can make no acceptable proposal that yields P a better outcome than the status quo (because proposing any policy that P prefers to x( will result in censure). Since P will not make a proposal that results in a worse outcome than the status quo, P will either propose x (yielding x() or a policy she prefers to the status quo (also yielding x0, but resulting in censure). If cp > 0, then proposing x = x() gives P a higher utility than proposing any policy that leads to censure. Thus, P will propose x. If cp = 0, then proposing any policy that leads to censure gives P the same utility as proposing x = x0. Thus, P can propose any x E Z.
Q.E.D. Sufficiency. Assume D n E * 0, and let x E D n E. I show that b *(bc) = x is an equilibrium for any bc. If the majority proposes xf, then by proposition 2, P will accept xf (because x E E). By definition of D, xf E Di Vi E M, and by definition of Di, all members prefer making a common acceptable proposal that is in Di to making any acceptable proposal that is not in Di. Thus, we only need to show that the utility for each member from proposing x is greater than the utility from proposing any policy that provokes a vote of confidence. The utility for each member from proposing x is ui(xf) -4[ui(x)]. The greatest utility that a member could ever receive from proposing a policy that provokes a confidence vote is ui(x). Since xf E Di Vi E M, u#(x) -a-[ui(x)] 2 ui(f) for each member. Thus, proposing xf gives each member a greater utility than any member could ever obtain from making a provoking proposal. Q.E.D.
The following corollary follows directly from the proof of proposition 3.
